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DICTA

TAX CHANGES AFFECTING CORPORATIONS*
By FRANK M. CAVANAUGH of the Denver Bar

The several corporate topics I have to discuss are quite distinct in nature. They each contain significant changes and their
significance is in part explained, if you keep in mind the underlying spirit of the revision, namely, increased investment incentive
as outlined in the President's pre-enactment budget message. The
keystone was "taxroom for growth," especially within the area of
new corporate businesses, spelled out with greater clarification and
simplification into language that gives statutory guidance to every
major corporate action.
With respect to the topics outlined for my discussion, the drafters had in mind, either curtailment of corporate tax avoidance on
the one hand or easing some excess penalizing features of the old
law, especially where hampering legitimate expansion, on the other.
As you know, about the only reduction measures were with respect
to lower bracket individual taxpayers.
ACQUISITIONS TO AVOID TAX-SECTION 269

Taking up the policing measures and starting first with Section 269, one recalls that Congress over a decade ago foresaw that
obtaining the loss carry-overs and unused excess profits tax experience of existing shell companies would catch the eye of corporate
management starting up strong in wartime ventures.
The gimmick of acquiring loss companies to ease the tax on
expected high profits was then anticipated, especially in connection
with World War II excess profits tax. In Section 129, enacted in
1943, Congress figured it had forestalled the temptation to carry on
new business within the framework of loss companies.
In fact, the government had theretofore a pretty fair arsenal
to block such traffic. There was some favorable high court interpretation on "business purpose" requirement, as in the Gregory,
Griffiths, Smith and Spreckels cases.' These and old Section 45
(now 482) held the front pretty well up to that point. However,
the broader net pulled together in 129, intended to strengthen
these rules, but never succeeded. The storehouse of business purpose
cases was immediately and sadly depleted or weakened by a series2
of adverse decisions, starting with the Alprosa Watch decision,
where the Tax Court just reached out and slapped the new section
down before it actually got started.
There, the acquisition occurred in a fiscal year just prior to
the effective date of 129 but the Tax Court more or less gratuitously
construed it as applying only where an acquirer survives after
absorbing the loss or other unused allowance from a deficit com* From an address, given at the University of Denver Tax Institute, 1954.

Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 79 L. Ed. 596, 55 S. Ct. 266 (1935);
Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355, 84 L. Ed. 319, 60 S. Ct. 277 (1939); Smith v.
Higgins, 308 U. S. 473, 84 L. Ed. 406, 60 S. Ct.-355 (1940); Spreckels v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 626, 86 L. Ed. 1073, 62 S. Ct. 777 (1942).
2-Alprosa Watch Corp. v. Commissioner, 11 TC 240.
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pany. It took the entity tack and set off an endless chain of downstream mergers into loss companies. The department took its licking, acquiescing as it went along, thereafter, in Tax Court cases
where 120 was invoked, such as in the Alcorn decision, 3 where it
sought to extend application to a corporate "split-up," followed by
the Berlands, Commodore Terminal, A. B. Container,4 and other
decisions.
The only inroad was the four-judge dissent written by Judge
Opper who heard the Chelsea case,5 but an appeal even, in that instance, to the Third Circuit was unsuccessful. The only victory,
if one would call it that, was Advance Machinery,6 an outside factual situation so thin it didn't warrant litigation. There, however,
the court ignored the 129 argument altogether and used Section 22,
and on appeal Section 45 was applied.
With such solid proof of failure for the government in the
background, what does 269 now provide? What kind of an "assist"
did Congress give the Commissioner in the new law? First, we note
that the imposition and general coverage provisions of the section
remain the same. But a new proof element is provided to boost the
Commissioner over the tax-versus-business-purpose hurdle in these
cases.
Here is statutory paraphrasing with only formalistic deletion:
(1) Whenever individuals acquire directly or indirectly 50 per cent
control of a corporation or a corporation acquires directly or indirectly property of another corporation not theretofore so controlled
by it or its stockholders and (2) the basis of such property in the
hands of the acquirer is determined by reference to basis in the
hands of the transferor and (3) the principal purpose for such
acquisition was tax avoidance by securing the benefit of a deduction, credit or other allowance which would not otherwise obtain,
then, in such instances, the benefit shall be disallowed except in the
discretion of the department to allow part or to apportion such
benefit to a degree deemed not tainted by avoidance in principal
aspect. That is the old 129 provision.
Comes now the pertinent amendment, and I quote the statute:
"The fact that the consideration paid upon an acquisition . . . is
substantially disvroportionate to the aggregate- (1) of the adjustel basis of the ... interest ... or of the property ... and (2)
of the tax benefits . . . not available . . . otherwise . . . shall be
prima facie evidence of the principal purpose of evasion or avoidance.. ." [our italics].
'Alcorn Wholesale Co. v. Commissioner, 16 TC 75, CCH Dec. 18,034, 1951
CCH 7234.
' Der'and's. Inc. v. Commissioner, 16 TC 182, 1951 CCH 7257, CCH Dec. 18,057,
1951-2 CD 1; Commodores Point Terminal v. Commissioner, 11 TC 411, 1949 CCH
7010: A. B. Container Corporation v. Commissioner, CCH Dec. 17,641, 14 TC
842 (1950).
Commiss'oner v. Chelsea Products, Inc., 197 F (2d) 620 (3rd Cir. 1952).
'Advance Machinery Exchange v. Commissioner, 196 F (2d) 1006 (2nd Cir.
1952).
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Here then is an added presumption based on dollar tax savings. The House version had made this evidence in itself governing or determinative but the Senate softened the blow, thinking
that it might, in its effect, automatically bar incidental tax benefit
otherwise available or make it too tough to prove that avoidance
was not the real reason for the acquisition.
This amendment is hard to evaluate. Except for this change,
we have to work with the old law as it was interpreted by the Tax
Court. The "substantially disproportionate" phrase is unfortunate.
That language has always been too relative for any kind of uniform
court handling, and, elsewhere in the reorganization sections of the
revised code, we notice Congress went to great pains to legislate it
out of existence.
The Senate's rejection of a "clear preponderance" burden gives
some hope for a continued favorable court interpretation where the
dollar imbalance between the business and tax advantage isn't too
obvious.
The "aggregate" of adjusted basis plus tax benefit will present valuation problems. Depreciable assets, for instance, with
a high base and a very low value may be offset by securities with
a low basis and a high value.
The valuing of the tax benefit "not otherwise available" to
the acquirer can produce difficulty in close cases. Apparently a
tax benefit fully paid for is available regardless of purpose. That
word "substantial" is hard to focus in any given set of facts and
is the key bad word of the new provision. What this new presumption is going to do remains to be seen. The Commissioner has his
usual presumption riding with the determination in every case, but
I guess this new one is designed to pull the government's case out
of the subjective realm and present a practical fact test for the
courts.
Throughout the history of old 129 the court backed away from
weighing levels of intent. It looked for a sound business purpose
and if it existed the taxpayer got his break. This later presumption will arise now on proof of a basic fact of substantial disproportion. Instead of digging into the evidence to find whether or not
a live business motive is squirming within each transaction, the
court is expected to weigh first the dollar advantages stemming
strictly from tax considerations, and, if the taxpayer isn't quick
to show offsetting business risk or relative dollar disadvantages,
the government has its purpose wrapped up and its case won.
The new section forces the court into close practical dollar
analysis of each transaction before it can find purpose on one side
or the other. It behooves those planning acquisitions with some
tax benefit in the picture to do the same analysis and perhaps to
get a prospective ruling from the department in a close situation.
If the ruling is adverse, it can then weigh its litigating chances
against the background of the old law.
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This section has to be worked in with the new limitations on
net operating loss carry-overs added by Sections 381 and 382 and
is pretty closely related to Section 1551 coming up next in our
discussion.
In connection with both Sections 269 and 1551, the reorganization provisions have to be watched. Gain recognition can mean
greater cost taxwise than a deduction or credit allowance.
DISALLOWANCE OF EXEMPTION AND EARNINGS

CREDIT-SECTION

1551

Section 1551, the multiple entity or split-up provision, had its
forerunner in 15(c) enacted in 1951 and otherwise expiring with
the excess profits tax last year. The latter, which has an interesting legislative history, is now taken over and extended indefinitely
and entirely intact. The only exception is a disallowance of the new
minimum accumulated earnings credit which has been tacked on
to the minimum surtax exemption in place of the old minimum
excess profits tax credit.
The split-up technique whereby corporate taxpayers laden
with earnings would, instead of climbing the surtax ladder and
meeting a high excess profits burden, make a tax-free exchange
of heavy income-producing assets for stock in new companies.
This spawning of new companies was accomplished without loss
of control or other disadvantage and was pure tax savings. Congress, fully aware of what was going on, put this new law info
effect to curb such proliferation of corporate entity; but again, as
in old 129, it set out some dye-markers for the loophole seekers.
The House had proposed H.R. 123 before 15(c) was adopted.
This 123, if passed, would have been a road blocker for sure for all
multiple entity traffic. The House limited the $25,000 surtax exemption and the $25,000 minimum EPT credit to one, i.e., to the
parent member of the group of related companies as though they
in association were a single business. This applied where 95 per cent
common stockholding was defined through constructive ownership
tests.
The split-up technique was near its worst at that time and the
House committee saw it as a clear unintended tax advantage to
the big corporate operators with no advantage to small business.
No doubt at that point the drift to artificial corporate splitting
created a gap needing immediate legislative attention, but, as the
Senate then recognized, this would be a harsh enactment. It would
have had a bad effect on new small growing businesses which are
frequently required to incorporate separately if state law forbids
chartering for more than one purpose. Also a related new company is frequently necessary when a new and risky enterprise is
sought to be developed. The Senate, in rejecting it, also pointed
out that existing multiple corporations would have a tremendous
advantage over those seeking the same type of tax-saving expansion.
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This discrimination between new and old corporations and
other inequitous features were forceably brought to the attention
of the Senate by real estate and other groups vitally interested in
blocking passage of H.R. 123. In any case, we have had for over
three years 15 (c) as a compromise on the books with no case law
yet to tell us just what it means. The government has been understandably a little timid about this companion piece to their business-versus-tax-purpose problem after their 129 experience.
This topic, Section 1551, is much narrower and must be closely
associated with our 269 discussion.
Here again I'm parroting the statute in its significant aspects.
It provides (1) if a corporation transfers all or part of its property
other than money to another corporation created for such purpose
or to one actually in existence though not actively engaged in business at the time of acquisition and (2) if after transfer, the contributing company or its stockholders or both are in 80 per cent
control of such transferee during that or any subsequent taxable
year, then, in such instance, the latter shall not for such year be
entitled to either the $25,000 surtax exemption or the new $60,000
accumulated earnings credit unless such acquiring company establishes, by a clear preponderance of evidence, that neither of
such tax benefits were a "major purpose" of such transfer.
Note that only transfers between corporations are encompassed here and the acquirer can be either newly created or an
existing shell company. This leaves open, more or less, for "common law" tax restriction, that is, court decisions aided by Section
482 (the old Section 45), to catch those overly thin spin-off arrangements to sole proprietorships, partnerships, trusts, etc.
The problem in this area has been to reintegrate or in effect
consolidate entities for income-reporting purposes. About all they
have wrung out of old 45 is reallocation of income and deductions.
In fact that's all Section 45 regulations provided. Court homage to
corporate entity have delimited application all the way, heretofore.
At least that has been 269's history.
The same cushion of discretionary allowance in whole or part
by the department is provided, as in 269, and the same rule of
constructive ownership for control purpose is provided. In fact,
Section 269 is cross referenced throughout this 1551 split-up section. In other words, the section is still supplemental and is to be
applied consistently with 269.
The control in 1551 must be 80 per cent before denial can be
accorded by the Treasury. A shift of 21 per cent of stock would
clear, but here again recognition problems can crop up when you
disturb ownership.
A significant break is retained in that a transfer of money is
not prohibited. The section covers only all or part of any property
transferred which might raise a question about intangibles-transfer of management, good will, etc.
Over-all, while the section is narrower, it is intended as a
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much tighter provision. That "major purpose" is a pretty low
ceiling, and, as I said, we have no court guide for this carry-over
provision as yet.
The regulations under both old 129 and 15 (c) shed some light
as to what we can expect in the new ones. They both drew out of
the law everything Congress put in it. "Principal purpose" is that
exceeding any other purpose. "Major purpose" is an important
consideration or factor. Fixing a degree of difference between a
major purpose in this section or the principal purpose in the other
would, as one writer put it, take more of a semanticist than a lawyer. One would safely derive that a major purpose need not be a
principal purpose, of course, so that a company seeking these two
1551 benefits would get caught much quicker, but what transaction
of any consequence today is without a major tax consideration?
Clearing the reorganization "business purpose" (old 112 (g)) hurdle is not help here under present regulations.
The regulations will likely go as far as they can to screen
corporate transactions falling within the purview of these sections.
The last time a "major" purpose was going on the Treasury's books
as meaning any purpose other than "incidental" such a howl of
administrative legislation was raised that Treasury backed off.
The legislative history of this section and its forerunner
doesn't disclose why "money" was excepted, probably on the theory
that the purpose is to discourage tax segregation of a single company's operating or income producing assets, while money is a
neutral commodity. It can be otherwise acquired through borrowing and that act itself would show business purpose. Besides the
one credit it denies on a premise of a major purpose, the $60,000
accumulation credit would collide with an expansion allowance
specifically permitted by the Senate Committee report on Section
531 (old 102) which we will discuss later.
A summary prepared by the Joint Committee staff when its
predecessor Section 15(c) was enacted states that any company
wishing to expand may use any part of its funds, whether accumulated earnings or not, to form capital for a new company. The
transferee can then presumably with these funds turn around and
buy any stock-in-trade or property from the transferor, and thus
do indirectly what seems directly prohibited.
Apparently, if there is failure by a clear preponderance in
showing that either the surtax exemption or accumulations credit
were not a major purpose, both benefits are lost.
While the Tax Court pointed out in its recent "business purpose" cases today's need to scrutinize the tax feature of any business change, it seems a tight squeeze to clear this section. There
hasn't been much stress in minutes in all these won cases. This is
a point to watch if there is a heavy incidental tax break involved
within a plan!
Advisers should urge caution, but if there exists an actual
provable business need, I doubt if the Service will assert 1551 and
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deny these two benefits. In the first place, now there is not the
tax-saving factor there was when first enacted. A "boot" or mixed
transfer of money plus assets ought to clear easier. In a divisivetype reorganization it may be otherwise difficult to get total nonrecognition.
It is a degree question in each case. You can't take the tax
factor out of a plan of business division, but it's the abusive, amoebic
sort of entity multiplication without any evident business causation that puts the tax element out in front. In this multiple entity
area, the Commissioner may now don all of his new armor-Sections 269, 1551, 482 and whatever label 22(a) is wearing nowto make a multiple attack in a good situation to get some favorable
case law on the books.
CONTRIBUTIONS-BASIS-DEDUCTIONS--SECTIONS 118, 362, 246
With respect to our next subject, Sections 118 and 362, the
enactment codifies the general rule that gross income is not to include any capital contribution. There is one significant new provision, however, 362 (c), dealing with a situation where property
is contributed by non-shareholders or those without proprietory
interest. The old Brown Shoe situation 7 dealt with this a few years
ago in the Supreme Court.
Occasionally, a commercially aggressive Chamber of Commerce, association of businessmen, or even a government has contributed, without cost, property to induce a big manufacturing concern to locate a factory in a particular area. All such contributions
received after the middle of this year, when not contributed by
shareholders themselves, take a zero base in the recipient company
on transfer date.
The committee went a step further and provided, where money
is contributed by non-shareholders and property is acquired with
the donated funds within twelve months, such purchased property
takes a zero base to the recipient and any excess proportionately
reduces other properties. Regulations will prescribe a selection
method. Both property purchased and property so reduced will
start from zero at the end of the twelve-month period following
transfer. The drafters felt that since this type contribution constitutes neither a gift nor indirect compensation for future service
such handling provides a practical solution.
With respect to the 85 per cent dividends-received deduction
to corporate stockholders (Section 246), there isn't much change,
the code continues the disallowance to China trade corporations,
those whose income is from U. S. possessions, exempt companies,
farmers' co-ops, etc., as before.
It is interesting to note that the House bill denied this benefit
to insurance companies. The latter were quick to protest this proposed enactment, however, and the Senate defeated the proposal,
I Brown Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 339 U.S. 583.
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pointing out that some types of companies such as stock, casualty,
etc., pay the full corporate tax, and, furthermore, in present intercorporate arrangements recipient corporations would be unable to
meet commitments if denied this credit.
1361
Turning now to the "tax break" side of the corporate picture,
we bump into a new election privilege extended to proprietorships
and partnerships. They can now be taxed as corporations without
0
actually changing their legal form.
Pointing out principal requirements of this new privilege,
which, I am afraid, will have to be pretty heavily supplemented by
regulations, we see the law specifies such election can be made not
later than sixty days after any taxable year in which qualification
is sought. It applies to any unincorporated business enterprise,
and all partners owning an interest at any time during a taxable
year in which qualification is sought must join in the election.
Such an election qualifies corporate tax treatment provided:
(1) At all times after the first day of the first taxable year to
which it applies, the enterprise is owned by an individual or partnership of not more than fifty members.
(2) No proprietor or partner having over a 10 per cent interest in profits or capital is similarly qualified in another such
unincorporated business and is not an alien or foreign partnership.
(3) The enterprise is one in which capital is a material income-producing factor. For example, if a manufacturer or merchandiser seeks election, such assets as plant and inventory must
stand in strong ratio to income. Personal service partnerships such
as law and accounting are excluded. The withholding for employees, the pension trust and such things do not apply to the member partners or proprietor.
(4) At any time there is a change of ownership amounting to
20 per cent a new election must be made by all continuing partners,
but there is a privilege of carry-over to successor enterprises not
otherwise failing the ownership test. Constructive ownership rules
apply for purposes of interest determination.
(5) The normal tax, surtax, accumulation tax, alternate capital gains tax, etc., all apply as in the case of a corporation.
(6) Personal holding income is excluded. It is treated as
though there were no election and taxed direct to the partners. In
other words, only the operating-income portion is subject to election, and, if personal holding income is distributed during the year,
it is not to be taxed as a corporate distribution. Any amount not
distributed is considered as paid-in surplus or a contribution to
capital. The income and expense attributable to such income are
considered expense to each partner or proprietor in accordance
with his distributive share. This personal holding company application provides automatic separation as to income, so there is no
possibility of entrapment as a personal holding company.
ELECTION FOR CORPORATE TAX TREATMENT--SECTION
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(7) Other distributions, current and in liquidation, are treated
the same as corporate distributions and a reasonable salary is allowed working partners. Another exception is that the enterprise
is not given corporate treatment for reorganization purposes.
I should mention that with respect to counting, if a partnership owns another partnership electing these provisions, all the
partners in the first partnership must be counted in determining
the fifty-partner limitation.
This is a tricky new provision and, as I indicated, the privilege
will likely not be availed of to any great extent until more clearly
defined by regulations. There are some obvious "bugs" or at least
gaps in the law. For instance, if a disqualifying event occurs and
is remedied within twelve months, is there an automatic liquidation? Is there liquidation gain if ownership falls below 80 per
cent after election but is later reacquired?
It may develop quite a break for high bracket proprietors or
small groups when you consider the salary allowance, lowering
corporate tax rates and the progress toward eliminating double tax
on corporate dividends. A 20 per cent shift in and out may become
pretty simple. At least, one can now choose a corporate tax bracket
without other legal incident. A sole-proprietor witness testifying
before the Ways and Means Committee for this new privilege
pointed out that over eight million reporting businesses are sole
proprietorships as against a little over one-half million corporations.
You can appreciate the many variables that will attend each
reporting business considering this new provision. A taxpayer
should make a close tax analysis before election.
PERSONAL HOLDING COMPANY-SECTION 541
Cutting now into the personal holding company topic (Section
541), we note that the rates and basic outline of the old law remains
the same but there are several inequities cured.
Historically, I found it interesting to note that there were less
than 5,000 of this type of corporate filing less than ten years ago.
I don't know what it is now, but how many there have been that
have met the definition and haven't been caught would be an interesting speculation. As you know, this isn't a revenue source, but
the revenue received in forced dividend payments would be another
matter.
You are all familiar with the tricky, embarrassing, returnfiling feature on this creature. The old regular corporate returns
asked the questions, which, after superficial scrutiny or perhaps
none, were answered negatively; and sometimes after a few years,
a zealous agent looking for a 102 deposit or similar adjustment
checks out a change of stock ownership or a new income definition
that one could only find through such careful search. The penalty
was heavy in such cases and avoidable only if full professional
blame was assumed, and any ensuing penalty and interest couldn't
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be wiped out by deficiency dividend procedure! If you qualify, the
return is now to be filed with the regular corporate income tax
form on a separate schedule, and the Commissioner has a six-year
statute if you fail to furnish the right information.
As an automatic or self-governing type penalty, this section
is quite in contrast to the old subjective business purpose test applying within the improper accumulations provision. It is an extreme measure designed to outlaw rather than discourage corporate investment income accumulation. The rates remain the same.
They had been raised in 1934 and retained within the framework
of the 1939 code. They are 75 per cent for the first $2,000 and 85
per cent thereafter.
The basic qualifications are, of course, stock ownership in five
or less indivduals and income of 80 per cent or more from specified
non-operating or personal investment sources.
The main substantive changes include:
(1) A flat 80 per cent test each year with respect to income,
which replaces the old 80 per cent for the first year and 70 per
cent thereafter for 3 years, before you can get out of the trap and
reacquire the 80 per cent limit again.
(2) A tax-exempt stockholder now counts as an individual
with an exception respecting religious and educational organizations.(3) The consolidated return privilege is extended with limitations to non-railroad affiliated groups and income definition is
changed in some material respects.
(4) Rental income from stockholders is tested for personal
holding classification only if there is other type personal holding
company income exceeding 10 per cent. In other words, only where
there is clear abuse will the old "country home" or "yacht" type
lease arrangement now classify. This was catching many innocent
real estate operators so the Senate eased the situation.
(5) The deficiency dividend method of wiping out the tax
portion less interest and penalty is broadened. The taxpayer is
given more time. The company has ninety instead of sixty days
after "determination" to distribute and 120 days to file claim for
deficiency dividend deduction. There isn't the delay in getting final
approval that previously existed. Now added to the closing agreement and Tax Court determinations is an informal determination
signed by the district director and the taxpayer.
The definition of undistributed personal holding company is
changed in several places which I won't go into here. Generally,
any change made there and with respect to adjustment to income
are on the taxpayer's side.
There is one significant new gap. There is nothing in the new
law keeping an otherwise personal holding company from increasing its rental income to 50 per cent or more of gross and thus avoiding income classification. This it may do by buying real estate with
company owned bonds pledged as securities. The Senate committee
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caught this gap but a proposal to sew it up was dropped in conference.
The one restrictive change in connection with counting exempt
shareholders doesn't go far. It doesn't include religious or educational, and you can see there is nothing to prevent five 20 per cent
stockholders from transferring one-half of their stock to five tax
exempts and thus fall outside the stockholding requirement.
(6) The House committee eliminated from the old code the
consent dividend privilege, but the Senate restored it after simplifying the restrictions as to dividend distribution within each year.
It pointed out that some regulated corporations would need this
allowance to avoid possibility of a surtax penalty.
531
Coming now to my final topic, Section 531. If you don't recognize its new label, it's the old 102 penalty and now new "Accumulated Earnings" tax.
This penalty has been eased to where it is perhaps pretty well
out of reach for most corporate taxpayers in this vicinity. I imagine
that most of those reporting locally average substantially below
middle-band in size, and the new $60,000 earnings credit, with
other new features we will point out, affords much needed protection to small companies.
A lot has been written about the unreasonable accumulations
penalty. Corporate managers have always felt nervous and shaky
about this section. They witnessed the discomfort of their competitors or corporate neighbors who were tapped by the agent for what
looked like unseasonable rather than unreasonable accumulations.
Historically, it had been in the law from the beginning and is designed to prevent surtax avoidance by a family or closed corporation through the medium of accumulating corporate earnings and
avoiding the second dividend tax to the stockholders on distribution.
The psychological scare of this section has lessened in recent
years. Its bark is worse than its bite. Rate changes have taken
out much of its sting. The cost of penalty and distribution about
equalize at the $100,000 corporate and $12,000 single stockholder
level-both about 46.3 percent. It may be wise or unwise to accumulate and accept the penalty but it is still an important dollar
decision, that is, it is still much more economical if you can accumulate and not pay the penalty! The new and substantial overhauling given this section is a very significant break to young,
close corporations, especially in an expanding competitive industry.
An interesting congressional study, picking up the eleven years
per
following the 1938 enactment, when the present rates of 27
cent on the first $100,000 accumulation and 381/ percent accumulation thereafter were enacted, along with the presumption attending the fact of excess accumulation over immediate business
need, has been prepared by Professor Hall of the University of
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX-SECTION
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Washington. This study, made from government records, covered
about 70 percent of all cases. It showed that roughly five hundred
companies with less than twice that many years had been subjected
to penalty.
Projecting this study, we see something less than eight hundred companies have paid a penalty out of the approximate half
million filing. Only about one hundred cases in all were tried and
the government's batting average was less than half. In the last
few years, about a dozen cases were tried, of which the Commissioner won two and collected less than 10 per cent of the asserted
penalty. Despite this and the fact that the section hasn't produced
much revenue, the penalty, as they say, has "set in" at every yearend dividend meeting as a dominant director and too frequently
tipped the scales to distribution affecting permanent damage to the
growth of the company.
With this background of the old section, we shall see where the
committee has answered the complaint of the tax bar in its revision.
The rates are the same as before, 271/2 percent on the first
$100,000 and 381/2 percent thereafter.
The penalty applies to every company, except the personal
holding company and an exempt corporation which is formed or
availed of for the purpose of avoiding the surtax. The fact that
earnings of the company are permitted to accumulate beyond the
reasonable needs of business shall be determinative to avoid the
tax on shareholders unless, by a preponderance of evidence, the
taxpayer proves to the contrary. It was clear preponderance in the
old law, of course. If the company is a mere investment company,
there is a prima faxie case for the government.
The committee report is replete with criticisms of the administrative handling of the old law, and I dare say the new provision,
even as watered down, will be given a cautious hand by Treasury.
Before getting into the revision feature very far, one should again
emphasize the spirit behind this amendment. Congress sought to
clear out any opportunity to continue the use of this section as a
threat to settle other issues. Heretofore, if a taxpayer had an
excess of 30 percent accumulation with a poor dividend record
and no record of immediate need, the government frequently placed
the taxpayer on the "hot roof" and watched him dance, handing
him waivers until he decided to buckle and trade this one out with
its high cost of litigation and dollar fright against unrelated issues.
This old section was a tough section for the government
agents also, and for the most part they were reasonable. I believe
that some of what was collected was caused by the taxpayer not
being prepared.
I recall one typical situation. Some good tax-paying people
came in and a big discussion ensued for a day or so to the effect
that they were preparing for a business recession, a capital cushion
argument. Actually, one did show a few years later in their in-
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dustry and they had some need for hedging. Well, they made a
beautiful argument, I recall, using hindsight. This was one of our
better hindsight cases, because we went even behind the hindsight
to some ancient protests prepared years earlier and stored in our
"dead file" portion of the case to get another carefully documented
argument to the effect that the accumulation was needed for an
anticipated boom.
Proof items like that sometimes had the taxpayer rocking back
on his heels, and he would pay "blood money" to get rid of the
penalty.
Commissioner Andrews before enactment said he welcomed a
change, including a burden shift, to convert this into a gentle lever
to get the government's share, rather than a club to kill off company growth.
There are some significant subjective changes, some of which
were in committee reports and should be incorporated into the regulations. For instance, there will be no more hindsight and there
will be no more 70 percent yardstick. An operating subsidiary, if
80 percent controlled, is a legitimate use of accumulated earnings.
It makes no difference whether or not it is a divergent line of business, and a fact determination is available if less than 80 percent
control is traceable back to the earning source. The "immediacy"
test is out. Here the law itself provides that the accumulation shall
be unchallenged if it meets the "reasonably anticipated" needs of
the business.
There are two big law changes with respect to what earnings
the penalty now hits. First, the taxpayer is given a minimum
$60,000 accumulated earnings credit. Secondly, the tax now applies only to that portion proved unreasonable. This latter revision
has been a strong point in the consistent fight industry has waged
on this provision.
Of course, the most dramatic change is with respect to the
burden shift which was finally pushed through. Under the old law,
not only proof but a clear preponderance was required of the taxpayer that earnings accumulated were business motivated.
The burden shift operates this way. First, before the deficiency notice is sent out, the government sets up the amount they
think unreasonable and then by registered notice advises the taxpayer that they are going to assert that much penalty. The taxpayer is then going to be given at least thirty days, possibly more
by the new regulations, to spell out in a reply why he needs this
accumulation in his business.
The government can then, presumably, back off or move in
for such amount or a lesser amount in the final notice. But on any
portion in which they have locked preliminary proceedings in this
matter, the government has the burden, and it's an automatic shift
where there is a jeopardy or the government doesn't send notice.
Of course, if the taxpayer fails to send in his reply, he keeps the
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burden and, as to any new grounds which he didn't cover in his
reply to the preliminary notice, he will keep the burden.
The taxpayer has the same old tools to fight with or factors
to explain, that is, the criteria spelled out by the courts, such as
overcoming or explaining what appears to be excessive liquidity.
Why do you need the quick asset position? What about these loans
to your stockholders? Your minutes do not show anything about a
need! Where is the proposed building contract or expansion commitment?
The taxpayer has until April 15 of the following year to pay
dividends or accumulate, thus giving plenty of time to decide which
way to jump, under the new code.
Mere preponderance as distinct from a clear preponderance
is all that is required from either party, but I don't think this provides much change. There has been a pretty practical attitude
shown by the courts, but this fits nicely into the general relaxing
scheme of the amendment and gives a judge a nice out in a close
case.
The tax only applies to the unreasonably accumulated portion.
This gets right into bedrock and takes the dollar fright out of the
section. Actually, if one had a good 80 percent business need before, one did not lose one's case, but it was difficult to objectively
calculate litigation chances with one facing a penalty up to nearly
40 percent of one's full accumulation.
Since the Commissioner now has the burden, both to the extent as well as to the fact of accumulation, he may be moved back
so far in extent of accumulation that he won't have enough to
fight over. He will drop it! In other words, with a narrow dollar
layer to fight over, there isn't much tolerance for business judgment as to whether one needed the whole amount or not. All in all,
anyone that gets seriously hurt now under this new section seemingly deserves it.
The effective date here is important-ninety days after enactment or about November 14-so maybe the service is beating the
deadline on cases now in process. It would have behooved them,
with this burden coming up, to clean out their old 102 inventory.

A CLAUSE OF A LAWYER'S WILL
Here is a clause for your own will or codicil:
"I hereby give and bequeath to THE COLORADO BAR
FOUNDATION, Inc., a Colorado not for profit corporation,
the sum of $ ----------....--------- , to be used by it for its general
purposes."
Your own interest in the activities of the Foundation
will help you to determine the appropriate figure to put in
the blank after the dollar sign.
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SALES, EXCHANGES AND CAPITAL ASSET
TRANSACTIONS*
BENJAMIN HARROW
Of the New York Bar, C.P.A.. New York. Professor of haiw.
St. John's University. Nev.: York. N. Y.

The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, like the previous code
and the revenue acts before that going back to 1913, includes ih
the concept of taxable income gains resulting from the sale or
exchange of property. Because of the non-recurring nature of such
a gain, it has received special treatment if the property sold or
exchanged qualified as a capital asset. The determination of the
gain or loss to be recognized upon the sale or exchange of property
involves several factors. First, there is the factor of the cost or
other tax basis of the property. Not all property is acquired by
purchase for cash and hence the nature of the acquisition (by gift,
by inheritance, in a non-taxable exchange) affects the tax basis.
Another factor is that of adjustment to the basis because the
taxpayer may have made capital improvements to the property
or he may have recovered part of his cost or other basis through
depreciation. A third factor is the length of time the property
was held by the taxpayer. This is important because of the special
technical requirement in determining the kind of capital gain or
loss that may result on the sale of the property (long term or short
term).
Since capital gain or loss treatment of taxable income is more
favorable taxwise than ordinary income treatment, taxpayers have
sought where possible to bring income within the favored classification.
In a number of situations Congress has deliberately permitted
taxpayers to treat as a capital gain income that might otherwise
be considered ordinary income. This paper will be concerned with
some of the changes made by the 1954 code in the treatment of
certain sales and exchanges as capital asset transactions. The discussion will be limited to those special situations in this area of the
code that the Institute felt should be brought to the attention of the
members. These will be considered in the order in which they
appear in the code.
LOSSES BETWEEN RELATED TAXPAYERS-SECTION

267

A gain or loss is usually recognized when a transaction has
been completed. Under prior laws it was comparatively easy to
establish a loss on the sale of property by selling it to a related
taxpayer, and still retain some control over the property because
it remained in the family, so to speak. Congress closed what it considered a tax loophole by disallowing a deduction for a loss on a
sale between a taxpayer and members of his family, or between
an individual and a corporation, if more than 50 per cent in value
* From an address given at the University of Denver Tax Institute, 1954.
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of the outstanding stock is owned, directly or indirectly, by such
individual. If the same individual owns more than 50 per cent in
value of the outstanding stock of two corporations, a loss on a sale
between the corporations is disallowed if either corporation was a
personal holding corporation or a foreign personal holding company for the year preceding the date of sale. A loss on a sale
between the grantor of a trust and the fiduciary of the trust is
likewise not deductible. The disallowance of a loss in a transaction within these relationships was in the 1939 code.
The new code adds three other categories in this loophole-closing provision: a transaction between the fiduciaries of two trusts if
the grantor of both trusts was the same person; a transaction between the fiduciary of a trust and a corporation if more than 50 per
cent in value of the outstanding stock of the corporation is owned by
the trust or by the grantor of the trust; and a transaction between
an individual and an exempt charitable or educational organization controlled by such individual or members of his family.
Constructive ownership rules are applied in determing whether
taxpayers are related, just as under the 1939 code.
A loss resulting from the distribution of property in a corporate liquidation does not come within this rule of disallowance
of losses.
Under the 1939 code, not only was the loss on the sale disallowed, but the transferee took his cost as a basis for subsequent
gain or loss. The loss was irretrievably wasted for tax purposes.
The 1954 code alleviates somewhat the harshness of the effect of
the disallowance of the loss by minimizing any gain recognized on
a subsequent sale by the transferee. The gain is taxable only to
the extent that it exceeds the disallowed loss to the transferor. The
benefit of the transferor's disallowed loss is allowed only to the
original transferee. However, if the transferee disposes of the
property in a tax free exchange, the benefit is extended to a disposition of the property received in the exchange. But neither
the basis of the property to the transferee nor the holding period
is affected. Nor is this provision available to the transferee if the
disallowed loss results from a wash sale.
This section also contains a provision disallowing unpaid expenses and interest if the taxpayer and the person to whom the
payment is to be made are within the relationships mentioned above
at the close of the year or within 21/2 months thereafter. Two additional conditions must be present for this disallowance. Within
the period mentioned above, the expenses or interest have not
actually been paid and the amount was not includable in the taxable income of the person to whom the payment is to be made.
The second condition is that by reason of the method of accounting of the person to whom the payment is to be made (cash basis,
for example) the item was not includable in such person's taxable
income for his taxable year because it was not paid to him.
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DISPOSAL OF COAL WITH A RETAINED ECONOMIC INTEREST-

SECTION 631 (C).

If the general rule defining capital assets were followed, the
disposal of coal would result in ordinary income. But the coal industry is one of those sick industries that needs assistance if it is
to survive. Even under the 1939 code it received some tax help in
that it was given capital gain treatment under specified conditions.
(Section 112(k) (21)). That is continued in the 1954 code with
some additional helpful features. The disposal of coal (including
lignite) held for more than six months by the owner under any form
of contract under which he retains an economic interest results in
a capital gain instead of ordinary income. The gain is measured
by the difference between the amount realized and the adjusted
basis for depletion plus deductions disallowed under another section of the law (Section 272). The latter provision is new and
refers to expenditures attributable to the making and administering of the contract and to the preservation of the economic interest
retained under the contract. The Senate Finance Committee report
states that such expenditures include ad valorem taxes imposed
by state or local authorities, costs of fire protection, insurance costs
of all kinds (not including liability insurance), costs incurred in
administering a coal lease including bookkeeping and technical supervision, interest on loans attributable to the coal, expenses of flood
control, legal and technical expenses incurred in connection with
the making of the contract, and expenses of measuring and checking quantities disposed of under the contract. Under prior law
nothing was said concerning the treatment of such expenses with
the result that capital gain treatment did not reduce the tax.
The new law makes certain that the taxpayer will get the
maximum tax benefit of these deductions. If the proceeds are less
than the costs, the excess is deductible as an ordinary loss under
Section 1231, since coal comes specifically within the definition of
property used in the trade or business (former 117(j)). If there
is no income under a coal contract, the expenses become deductible
as such from other ordinary income. If this capital gain treatment
is availed of, the taxpayer may not have the benefits of percentage
depletion. Coal royalty contracts are covered by this section, and
the term owner includes a sublessor. The date the coal is mined
is the date of disposal.
BASIS OF PROPERTY ACQUIRED FROM A DECEDENT-

SECTION 1014

It would obviously be inequitable to use the original cost of
such property as a basis for determining gain or loss on the disposition of the property, since the value of the property at death
or the optional valuation date one year thereafter is subject to an
estate tax. Consequently, the general rule has been, and is continued in the 1954 code, that the basis is the value of the property
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as of the date of death or the optional valuation date. The gross estate may include the value of property disposed of by a decendent
during his lifetime (transfers in contemplation of death, for example), or the gross estate may include the value of jointly-held
property where the surviving joint tenant gets the property by reason of his survivorship. Under prior law the basis of the property
could be the decedent's cost. The new code applies the general basis
rule to all property included in the gross estate. The code enumerates nine types of transfers of property that are intended to be covered by the new rule.
The new basis rule does not apply if the property, though includible in the gross estate, has been sold or disposed of before the
death of the decedent. One possible adjustment to the basis may
be required. The value at the applicable valuation date must be
reduced by any income tax deductions that were allowed for depreciation or depletion before decedent's death.
Property representing a right to receive income is valued for
estate tax purposes. The person who thereafter receives such income receives the benefit of an income tax deduction for the portion
of the estate tax resulting from the inclusion of such property in
the gross estate. For that reason the basis section is not applicable
to such property. For similar reasons this new basis provision does
not apply to restricted stock options owned by a decedent and which
he has not exercised at the time of his death.
1016
Capital expenditures and capital recoveries require an adjustment to the tax basis in determining gain or loss in the event of a
sale. The new code enumerates fifteen situations that may require
such an adjustment. A few of these will be considered. A taxpayer may elect to capitalize taxes and carrying charges. If he
does not do so, he obviously may not add these to the tax basis of
property sold. The same is true of expenditures relating to circulation expenses that are allowed as a deduction under Section 173.
The adjustment required for depreciation and depletion merits
special comment. The general rule is the same as under the 1939
code. The recovery of capital by reason of depreciation or depletion allowed as deductions is a required adjustment, but the adjustment may not be less than the amount so allowable. To the
extent that the amount allowed or allowable did not result in a
reduction of tax, no adjustment to basis need be made. The latter
provision is not aplicable to the period prior to January 1, 1952,
unless the taxpayer so elects.
The determination of the amount allowable presents some
problems because of the new provisions expanding the method that
may be used in computing the deduction for depreciation. This
section therefore provides that allowable depreciation for basis
adjustments will be computed under the straight line method if
none of the several methods under the depreciation section have
ADJUSTMENTS TO BASIS-SECTION
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been adopted. This section also provides that the use of one of
the methods prescribed in Section 167 for any one year will be
considered as the adoption of that method for all years, even
though the deduction may have been omitted in other years.
The basis of property must be adjusted for depreciation and
depletion even though the property was held by a person or an
organization not subject to income taxation. That would apply
to a tax exempt organization, a nonresident who later became a
resident, or to a nonresident foreign corporation from which property is acquired with a substituted basis.
Other adjustments enumerated include tax free distribution
in the case of stock, amortizable bond premium in the case of bonds,
unrecognized gain in the case of a residence, deferred expenses
relating to expenditures made in the development of mines and
research and experimental expenditures.
The basis of property is determined in many situations by
reference to a transferor's basis or to the basis of other property
held at any time by a taxpayer. Such a basis is known as substituted
basis.
1021
This is a one sentence provision in the code providing that the
adjusted basis in case of the sale of an annuity contract shall in
no case be less than zero. This is a provision favorable to the taxpayer. Under the new provisions for determining the taxable portion of an annuity, it is possible for a long-lived taxpayer to recover
tax free more than the cost of the annuity. If he should thereafter
sell his annuity contract, which is a capital asset, he will not have
a negative basis.
SALE OF ANNUITIES-SECTION

1033
An involuntary conversion of property is not a completed
transaction under certain conditions and therefore need not be a
taxable exchange of property. This provision applies to the destruction of property, seizure or condemnation, or theft. No gain
is recognized if such property is converted into property similar
or related to it in service or use.
If the property is converted into money or into property after
December 31, 1950, not similar to the converted property, gain is
recognized unless the taxpayer acquires similar property within
one year after the first taxable year in which the gain on the conversion was realized. The purchase of stock in a corporation satisfies this requirement if the taxpayer acquires control of the corporation. To the extent that the amount realized on the conversion
exceeds the cost of the other property, the gain is recognized. A
loss is also recognized. If the taxpayer acquires other property or
stock before the conversion, it will not be considered replaced property unless he holds it at the time of the conversion. Such property
must be acquired by purchase only. With the consent of the Secretary or his delegate the one year period may be extended.
INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS-SECTION

DICTA

February, 1955

An assessment of a deficiency in tax attributable to a gain upon
the conversion of property may be made within three years from
the time the Secretary is notified of the replacement of the converted property, or of an intention not to replace the property.
If no gain is recognized on the involuntary conversion under
the above provisions, the basis of the new property is the same as
the basis of the converted property, with the capital adjustments
to the date of the conversion. If a loss was recognized, the basis
of the new property is its cost. If a gain was recognized on the
conversion, the basis of the new property is its cost less any portion
of the gain not recognized. If no gain was recognized because the
cost of the replacement exceeded the amount received, there has
been a partial recovery of the cost of the old property, and the unrecognized gain reduces the basis of the new property.
The involuntary conversion of a residence comes within the
rules of this section. Added to the involuntary conversion rules by
the new code is a provision treating the sale of property under the
acreage limitation provisions of the Federal Reclamation laws as
an involuntary conversion, and also the sale or destruction of livestock on account of disease. The latter provision will involve problems of replacement period, accounting method, etc., which perhaps
the regulations will clarify.
1034
Because there is no specific provision in the code allowing a
deduction for personal loss, except for casualty losses, a loss on
the sale of a personal residence is not deductible. Because the
definition of gross income is so sweeping, "income from whatever
source derived", a gain on the sale of a personal residence is taxable. This situation in recent years developed some inequities,
particularly in the period of inflation and a war economy. As a result, Congress introduced a provision under the 1939 code which
is continued in the 1954 code that utilizes the principles of involuntary conversions in the case of sales of a personal residence.
A gain on the sale is not recognized if a residence is sold after
December 31, 1953, and within the period of one year before the
sale and one year after the sale another residence is purchased and
the cost of the new residence exceeds the adjusted sale price of
the old residence. The latter term is new in the 1954 code and is
defined as the amount realized less expenses for work performed on
the old residence to assist in its sale. Such work must be performed
within ninety days ending on the day on which the contract to sell
the old residence is entered into. The work must be paid for within
thirty days after the sale of the old residence and the expenditures
are not allowable as deductions in computing taxable income. Selling expenses, including broker's commissions, are deducted from
the sales price to compute the gain.
If a taxpayer constructs a new residence, the one year period
SALE OR EXCHANGE OF RESIDENCE-SECTION
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after the sale is extended to eighteen months. The adjusted basis
of the new residence is reduced by the amount of the gain not recognized on the sale of the old residence. If any part of the new residence is acquired by gift or inheritance it is not included in computing the gain on the sale of the old residence; but it is included
in determining the basis of the new residence. The term residence
includes stock held by a tenant-stockholder in a cooperative housing corporation, if the taxpayer used the house as a principal residence or will use it as such.
If a husband and wife use the old and new residence, the cost
of the new residence is that of the husband, wife, or both, no
matter how they hold the property. The unrecognized gain and the
basis adjustments will be allocated to husband and wife in accordance with regulations to be promulgated.
The one year period will be suspended during any time a taxpayer serves on extended duty with the Armed Forces of the United
States and during an induction period. Such period, however, may
not extend beyond four years from the date of sale of the old residence. This period applies also to the spouse of a taxpayer.
The involuntary conversion of a residence is covered by the
section dealing with such conversions. This works as an advantage
to the taxpayer, since it gives him the privilege of applying for a
longer replacement period.
1221
The definition is the same as in the 1939 code with one additional exclusion: accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or business for services rendered or from the
sale of inventory. The disposition of accounts or notes need not be
in the ordinary course of business.
CAPITAL ASSET DEFINED-SECTION

1232
The problem considered in this section is the treatment of
original-issue discount where bonds are issued at a discount. Under
the old law a redemption at face value could result in a capital gain,
except for non-interest-bearing obligations redeemable at a fixed
amount at stated intervals (old Section 42 (b)), short term obligations issued at a discount (old Section 42(c)), and U. S. Savings
Bonds. Under the new law the discount is apportioned over the
entire period to the maturity of the bond and treated as ordinary
income. If the bond is sold before maturity, a pro rata portion of
the discount is ordinary income. Any gain in excess of the discount is long term capital gain. These rules do not apply to tax
exempt state government bonds or discount bonds purchased at
a premium.
Original issue discount is the difference between the price at
which the bonds were sold originally to the public and the stated
redemption price at maturity. If such discount is less than onefourth of one percent of the redemption price for each year of the
life of the bond, the discount will be considered as zero.
BONDS AND OTHER EVIDENCES OF INDEBTEDNESS-SECTION
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Under the old law, the gain on the sale of bonds with excess
coupons attached was claimed to be capital gain. Under the new
law, if a bond is purchased after August 16, 1954, and any coupons
due more than twelve months after purchase date have been detached, an artificial discount is deemed to be created and any subsequent gain up to such artificial discount will be treated as ordinary income.
GAINS AND LOSSES FROM SHORT SALES-SECTION 1233
The device of a short sale had been used by taxpayers to convert long term losses into short term losses. The opportunities for
increasing allowable deductions by means of the short sale were
partially closed even under the 1939 code.
A gain or loss from the short sale of property results in a
capital gain or loss to the extent that the property used to close the
short sale is a capital asset to the taxpayer. This provision includes
transactions in commodity futures but does not include a hedging
transaction. Under the 1939 code all short sales resulted in capital
gains or losses. A dealer in securities with an unrealized profit
could make a short sale and close the sale by the delivery of dealer
security. The result would be a capital gain.
Under former Section 117(g) (1), a literal interpretation
would make a gain or loss on hedging transactions involving a short
sale a capital gain or loss. As interpreted by the Treasury Department such gain or loss was held to be ordinary income or loss.'
The 1954 code excludes short sales in hedging transactions from
the rule that gains or losses from short sales are capital gains or
losses.
With respect to short term gains and holding periods for short
sales, several rules are set forth in the 1954 code. The first rule is
that the gain resulting from the closing of the short sale is a short
term capital gain if on the date of the short sale the taxpayer has
held substantially identical property for not more than six months
and, also, if the taxpayer on or before the closing date of the
transaction acquires substantially identical property. This rule
applies regardless of when the property actually used to close the
sale was acquired. Furthermore, the holding period of the substantially identical property is considered to begin on the date of the
closing of the short sale, or on the date of a sale, gift, or other
disposition of such property, whichever occurs first.
The acquisition of an option to sell property at a fixed price
(a put) is treated as a short sale. The exercise of the option, or
the failure to exercise it, is treated as a closing of such short sale.
The new code provides an exception to the rule that the acquisition
of a "put" is a short sale where the "put" is acquired on the same
day that property identified as intended to be used in exercising
the option to sell is acquired, and the option is actually exercised
I GCM 17, 322, XV-2 CB 151.
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through the sale of property so identified. If the option is not exercised, the cost of the option is added to the basis of the property
with which the option is identified. This section applies only to
"puts" acquired after August 16, 1954.
A loss resulting from the closing of a short sale is a long
term loss if on the date of the short sale the taxpayer has held
substantially identical property for more than six months. This
rule applies without regard as to when the property was acquired
that was used to close the short sale.
The provisions with respect to short term gains and long term
losses apply to a contract to sell stock or securities on a "when
issued" basis. The performance of the contract or assignment of
it for value is considered as a closing of a short sale.
In the case of commodity futures such as wheat, cotton, hides,
etc., different commodities which are not generally used as hedges
for each other would not be considered substantially identical property, nor would commodities requiring deliveries in different months
be so considered.
In the application of the provision with respect to short sales
the term taxpayer includes the spouse of the taxpayer.
OPTIONS TO Buy OR SELL--SECTION

1234

As in the former law, an option is subject to the general capital gain provisions if the holder of the option is not in the business
of dealing in such options. This provision applies to options acquired after February 28, 1954. It governs a loss resulting from
the failure to exercise the option. The option must be held for more
than six months for the transaction to be a long term gain or loss.
An unexercised option entered into for hedging purposes related
to stock in trade results in an ordinary loss.
SALE OR EXCHANGE OF PATENTS-SECTION

1235

Under the former code there was some confusion as to the
treatment of the sale of patents. An assignment of rights under a
patent was a capital asset if the holder was an "amateur" inventor,
but not if he was a professional. That seemed to be definite if payment was made in a lump sum. If the payment was conditioned on
the use or profitability of the invention (royalties), the cases have
held that there was a sale or exchange, although the Commissioner
2
said it was ordinary income.
The new law treats an assignment or a license as a sale or
exchange of a capital asset held for more than six months without
regard to the actual holding period. Whether the inventor is a professional or an amateur is immaterial. If the transfer covers all
substantial rights or an undivided interest in the patent, the exact
form or interest transferred is immaterial. Nor is the form of
payment material. It may be in the form of royalties. But the
- Mini. 6490, 1950 CBA.
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transfer must be made by an individual whose efforts created the
patent, or by one who acquired an interest in the property for
money or money's worth paid to the inventor prior to the time the
invention was actually reduced to practice. There are two exceptions to the latter provision. An employer of the inventor does
not qualify. Nor does an individual related to the taxpayer qualify,
as that term is defined in Section 267 (b). Brothers and sisters are
expections to the exception, so that an assignment or license to
such persons qualifies for capital gain treatment under this section.
The new provisions apply to amounts received after August
16, 1954, even though the assignment took place in a period before
August 16, 1954, provided the assignment or license under which
the patents arise would qualify if they were made after August
16, 1954.
Any loss resulting from the assignment or license under the
new rule will result in a long term capital loss.
HOLDING PERIOD IN EXCHANGES OF NONCAPITAL
FOR CAPITAL ASSETS-SECTION

1223 (1)

The holding period becomes important in determining whether
a gain or loss is long term or short term. The general rule is that
where property received in an exchange has a carryover, in whole
or in part, of the basis of the property exchanged (a substituted
basis), the taxpayer may add the holding period of the property
exchanged to the holding period of the property received. In other
words, there is a carryover of the holding period as well as the
basis. However, the tacking on of holding periods is allowed only
where the property exchanged was a capital asset in the hands of the
taxpayer, or property used in a trade or business for which capital
gain treatment may be availed of (former Section 117(j)). or
property which is the subject of an involuntary conversion. This
provision applies to exchanges after March 1, 1954.
REAL PROPERTY SUBDIVIDED FOR SALE-SECTION

1237

Under the former code a taxpayer who disposed of a tract of
real property by subdividing it into lots, and who was not otherwise a dealer in real estate, might be taxed on his gains as ordinary
income. Cases go both ways. The new law clears up this situation.
It applies to a taxpayer other than a corporation and provides that
a tract of real property in the hands of such a taxpayer shall not
be deemed to be held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business solely because the taxpayer has subdivided the
tract into lots for purposes of sale. In other words, he will receive
some capital gain treatment.
Like so many of the provisions in the code, there are conditions. The tract must not previously (before August 16, 1954)
have been held for sale in the ordinary course of business, nor in
the year of sale may the taxpayer hold any other real property (he
must not be a dealer). The taxpayer must not make any substantial
improvement to the tract of land which substantially enhances the
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value of the lot sold. This provision includes the federal, state or
local government, if it constitutes an addition to the basis of the
property, such as a special assessment for paving a street. Except
in the case of inherited property, a lot or parcel must be held for
five years.
If the above condtions are met, the first five lots sold qualify
for capital gain treatment. In a year in which the sixth lot is sold,
5 per cent of the selling price will be treated as ordinary income
for all lots sold in that year. To get full capital gain treatment,
therefore, no more than five lots may be sold in the first year.
Expenditures incurred in connection with the sale of the lots
shall be applied against ordinary income first, and the balance will
reduce the amount realized on the sale.
The substantial improvement provision is clarified in the law.
It does not cover any improvement made, if the lot has been held
by a taxpayer for at least ten years and the improvement consists
of the building or installation of water or sewer facilities or roads.
Furthermore, the taxpayer must satisfy the Secretary or his delegate that the lot would not have been marketable at the prevailing
price without the improvement. The taxpayer must elect to make
no adjustment to the basis of the lot or of any other property
owned by the taxpayer on account of the improvements. The law
adds that such election does not make any item deductible which
would not otherwise be deductible.
A tract of real property is defined as a single piece of real
property. Two or more pieces will be considered a tract if they
were ever contiguous, or would be except for a road, street, etc.
If the last sale was made more than five years ago, the remainder of the tract becomes a new tract, and the sale of the first
five lots rule starts anew.
The new rules are applicable to sales made after December 31,
1953, except for purposes of the definition of tract and determining
the number of sales. For the latter, all sales during the period of
five years before December 31, 1953, will be taken into account.
TERMINATION PAYMENTS TO EMPLOYEE-SECTION 1240

Under the 1939 code capital gain treatment was accorded to
certain payments to an employee (old Section 117 (p)). The employee must have been employed for more than twenty years. The
rights to receive the payments had to be included in the employment agreement for not less than twelve years, and the total
amounts had to be received in one taxable year after termination
of the employment. This tailor-made provision is continued in the
1954 code with one addition, namely, that these rights were included in the terms of employment before August 16, 1954.
CANCELLATION OF LEASE OR DISTRIBUTOR'S

1241
Under the 1939 code it was uncertain as to whether an amount
received by a lessee resulting from the cancellation of a lease, or by
AGREEMENT--SECTION
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a distributor for cancellation of a distributor's agreement, constituted an amount received on the sale or exchange of property. That
element is essential for capital gain. The new code leaves no doubt
that such a transaction is a sale or exchange and will result in a
capital gain. In the case of a distributor of goods, the result would
be the same, provided the distributor has a substantial capital investment in the distributorship. It should be noted that the new
provision does not apply to an amount received by a lessor on the
cancellation of a lease.

TO EACH AND EVERY MEMBER OF THE
COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
DICTA is your law journal. It is written for you and it is supported by you. It is the sole purpose of DICTA to touch on legal
problems which are of interest to every Colorado lawyer. We are
aware that many of the problems which are of interest to you are
not covered in this journal. Every single lawyer in Colorado has
the opportunity to contribute to this journal. We are always happy
to receive an article or a comment by practicing attorneys.
The Editorial Staff of DICTA plans to have a spring issue
with a symposium on the general subject of EVIDENCE. We
would greatly appreciate an article or comment in this field from
you.
We hope that in the future we will continue to receive your
writing, and in that manner further the purpose of DICTA in serving you as a Colorado lawyer.
Please address all writing or comments to Mr. Arnold M.
Chutkow, 750 Equitable Bldg., Denver, Colo., or to Mr. Richard
Harvey, University of Denver College of Law, Denver, Colo.

ATTENTION SUBSCRIBER!
As announced in the July issue, the 30 year subject-author
index to DICTA is ready for your use. The students and attorneys
who have compiled the information feel that this publication will
be an invaluable aid in your library. This 85 page booklet, at a
printing cost to us of $2.00, is being made available to you as a
service of DICTA with no attempt to profit therefrom.
Please mail all checks to Mr. John Brooks, University of
Denver College of Law, with the checks made to the University
of Denver.
We sincerely solicit your support.
Thank you,
V. G. SEAVY, JR., Managing Editor.
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SOME ASPECTS OF THE SECURITIES
REGULATION LAW:
REGULATION "A" AND ITS REVISION
By ALLEN S. KRAKOVER
of the Colorado, New York and District of Columbia Bars*
and
IRVING M. MEHLER of the Colorado and New York Bars

It is axiomatic that history in some shape or form tends to
repeat itself. The mining industry fits quite well within the confines of this well known maxim. Boom and bust alternate, and we
are now witnessing what may be one of the greatest booms of all.
The uranium boom. The Colorado Plateau, more particularly the
65,000 acre mesa and rimrock country that extends into four states
-Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Arizona-is presently the chief
source of uranium mined within the United States and the second
largest producing area in the world. California, Nevada, Wyoming,
Montana, South Dakota and Washington all are gripped in feverish activity. The mining industry is presently again the cynosure
of the modern "get rich quick" adventurer, as well as the more
conservative stock market investor. The uranium boom has struck
this part of the country with forceful intensity.
With the advent of the uranium boom, it soon became apparent
that the supply of investment capital had not kept pace with the
financial needs of prospectors, claim stakers and mine operators to
further their operations with risk capital. The usual method of
raising capital by selling securities to the public in any amount
exceeding $300,000 entailed strict compliance with the Securities
Act of 1933 1 and necessitated a filing by the issuer of a complete
registration statement listing minutely detailed information of the
security, the issuer and the underwriters2 This filing was an
absolute condition precedent to the offering of the security for sale
in interstate commerce to the general public. It is true that such
a registration could be dispensed with if the issuer was inclined
to limit his selling activity to the residents of one state. In such
case, a mere filing with the particular State Commission would
suffice. But to carry out an offering in such a manner is a feat
of no small accomplishment. Every detail of the offering must
be minutely attended. One slip, be it even making an offer to sell
to the wrong person, is sufficient to cause all sales ab initio to be
deemed in violation of the Securities Act of 1933. Where a wide
market for distributive purposes is sought, which in turn necessarily involves interstate boundaries,' a compliance with the act
becomes mandatory.
* Mr. Krakover served as Attorney Adviser with the U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission in Washington, D. C., and with the Denver Regional Office.
'48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. Sec. 77.
'Ibid. Sec. 77 c.
3 Ibid. Sec. 77 c.
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SMALL ISSUES

The legislators long ago recognized the need for creating exemptions from the full registration procedure for issues of a small
amount or where the limited character of the public offering indicated such exemption. The act 4 makes provision for the Commission to create exemptions by rule. However, in view of the intent
of Congress to the effect that "this power is expected to be used only
in a sparing manner", 5 the reluctance by the Commission to act
along these lines had been quite manifest. The Commission early
adopted several exemptive rules-a special regulations (now known
as Regulation B) for fractional undivided interests in oil and gas
rights and a number of separate rules (at one time as many as
eleven, collectively known as Regulation A) for almost all types
of other securities. All these rules contained various terms and
conditions. Regulation B has remained more or less static, but
the substance of Regulation A dates from January 1, 1941; as of
that date, the Commission repealed all eleven of the old rules in
favor of a single exemption. In 1945, Congress adopted the $300,000 figure pertaining to "small" issues, which formerly had been
limited to $100,000. Just this summer, Congress considered a proposal to increase the exemption to $500,000. The proposal was not
adopted. 6
REGULATION A

Effective January 1, 1941, not only were the former existing
eleven rules repealed in favor of a single exemption, but the Commission shifted its administrative emphasis from the disclosure
requirements of the act to the fraud prevention provisions. 7 The
ancient doctrine of caveat emptor was slowly being shelved. This
trend had previously been enunciated by the highest court of the
land.8 Speaking for the court, Mr. Justice Black stated:
There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the
honesty of those with whom he transacts business. Laws
are made to protect the trusting as well as the suspicious.
The best element of business has long since decided that
honesty should govern competitive enterprises, and that
the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception.
Within a short period of time after the President had signed
the bill raising the figure in Section 3 (b) from $100,000 to $300,000, the Commission followed suit by increasing the figure in Reguiation A to the same amount with respect to primary offerings by
4 Ibid.
5

Sec. 77 c (b).
. R. Rep. No. 85.
6S. 2846.
Sec. Act Rel. 2410 (1940) Rule 161.
'FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U. S. 112, 116 (1937).
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the issuer.9 Nevertheless, the Commission did not change the
amount with respect to secondary offering by affiliates, presumably because the legislative background indicated that the purpose
of the statutory amendment was to facilitate the raising of new
capital by "small business ;" and the figure still stands at $100,000
for0 secondaries despite pressure from certain quarters to increase
it.'
It is interesting to note that under Regulation A, in contradistinction to the present Revised Regulation A, no prospectus or
selling literature was required. If written sales material was being employed, it had to contain a certain amount of minimal information such as, the name of the person by or for whom the
offering is being made, the number of units offered, the underwriting or other distribution expense per unit and in the aggregate, whether the offering is made by or for the issuer and the proposed use of the proceeds. 1' The philosophy of Regulation A was
emphasized by the following note appended to Rule 223 (a) :
The material filed pursuant to this rule is required
to be filed solely for the information of the Commission to
aid it in the enforcement of Section 17 of the act (the
fraud provision), and not for the purpose of enabling the
Commission to cite any deficiency in the information contained therein. The failure of the Commission at any time
to take action upon any information filed pursuant to this
rule does not indicate that the Commission considers the
information accurate, complete or not misleading.
Under Regulation A, a substantial growth in the amount of
financing took place.' 2 This growth proceeded steadily until 1952
when a tremendous surge in the amount of financing came to the
fore due to the uranium boom. Fortunately, the revised regulation
was then in effect.
REVISED REGULATION A
In further keeping pace with the current economic trend, the
Commission shifted its emphasis from the fraud prevention provisions back to the disclosure provisions of the act. On August 15,
1952, the Securities and Exchange Commission published notice
that it had under consideration a proposed revision of Regulation1
A under the Securities Act of 1933. This Revised Regulation A 3
provides an exemption from registration under the act for small
issues of securities, i.e., not exceeding $300,000 in amount, upon
compliance with the provisions of this regulation which went into
effect on March 6, 1953. It is significant that one of the important
changes brought about by the revision of Regulation A is the re'Rule 220 (a); Sec. Act Rel. 3066 (1945).
"Rule 220 (b).
" Rule 223.
'215 SEC Ann. Rep. 11 (1950).
"15 U.S.C. Sec. 77 c (b).

DICTA

February, 1955

quirement that an offering circular 14 containing certain minimum
information, in addition to specific financial facts, be employed in
the sale of securities under the aforesaid regulations. 5 In promulgating this new requirement, the Securities and Exchange Commission kept in mind the congressional intent to aid small ventures
by providing an exemption from the requirements of a full registration with respect to offerings not exceeding $300,000 in amount,
while making possible more effective enforcement of the anti-fraud
provisions of the law. 6 The statute indirectly requires that the
investor be furnished with such basic information as will show a
fairly complete picture of the enterprise in which he is being asked
to invest his funds. And viewed from the investor's perspective,
it was only fair that certain safeguards be provided for him against
unscrupulous operators.
In addition, the Commission has also made known its further
intent, by stating that the offering circulars proposed to be used in
connection with offerings under the Revised Regulation A will be
examined primarily from the standpoint of determining whether
the minimum basic facts are fully disclosed and whether these facts
indicate the existence of fraud in connection with the proposed
offering. This attitude on the part of the Commission is in keeping
with the basic purposes of the regulation to help the operator but
not to deny its fullest protection to the investor.
To further aid the incipient entrepeneur, the Revised Regulation A provides for the use of limited written advertisements or
other written communications 1 prior to the sending or giving of
the offering circular. Persons making an offering under this regulation are thus permitted to advertise inexpensively for the purpose of obtaining inquiries from persons who may be interested in
receiving the offering circular. The issuer is thus provided with an
additional prop to enable him to foster his business endeavors.
In addition to the advertisement permitted by Rule 220, an
issuer can also use what is known as a "tombstone" advertisement.
This type of advertisement was permitted under Regulation A
prior to its revision, and while the Revised Regulation does not
speak on the subject the Commission has not objected to the
"tombstone's" continued use.
The revised regulation also makes provision for denying or
suspending the exemption in cases where the Commission finds
that the conditions and terms of the exemption have not been
met.' In other words, if it is discovered that the offering circular
contains fraudulent information, or that fraud or deceit is being
perpetrated or would be perpetrated in the sale of the securities, the
Commission will invoke its power to deny or suspend its exemption
Revised Regulation A, Rule 219.
,5Revised Regulation A, Rule 219 (b) provides an exception as to offerings
of $50,000 or less.
: Ibid. Purpose of Revision.
" Ibid. Rule 220.
"sIbid.Rule 224.
14
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under the act. This power is in addition to the remedy open to the
Commission of applying to the courts for an injunction prohibiting
further violations.' 9
As previously pointed out, the revised regulation exempts offerings up to a maximum of $300,000. An offering on behalf of any
one person other than the issuer is limited to a maximum of
$100,000. Subject to this limitation, persons other than the issuer
may offer, in the aggregate, more than $100,000, but not more
than $300,000. An offering up to the $300,000 limitation may,
however, be made on behalf of the estate of a deceased person if
the offering is made within two years after the death of such
person.
Pursuant to the present administrative practice of the Commission, the revised regulation also provides for the filing of semiannual reports showing the progress of the offering. 20 After comfurther reports are repletion or termination of the offering, no
2
quired after the filing of the final report. '
It is significant to point out at this time that the Revised
Regulation A provides that a notification must be filed with the
Commission and that the offering circular required by Rule 219
is filed with and is to be deemed a part of this notification.2 2 Information such as the jurisdictions in which the securities are to
be offered, 23 contemplated additional offerings, 24 unregistered securities sold within one year, 25 predecessors, affiliates, directors, officers and promoters of the issuer, 26 and any and all information
relating to convictions, injunctions and fraud orders within the
preceding five years against the issuer or any of its directors, of27
ficers, promoters, predecessors or affiliates must be disclosed.
The notification also calls for a filing of certain exhibits 28 and
documents pertaining to the offering such as underwriting contracts and agreements of similar nature.
CONCLUSION

The writers wish to emphasize at this time that the Commission, as an administrative arm of the Federal Government, is an
agency whose strength lies in its flexibility and adaptability to the
vicissitudes that occur daily in the economic spheres of activity.
This administrative strength was proven by the timely adoption of
Revised Regulation A in further keeping with the present necessity
19

15 U.S.C. Sec. 77 t.

"Ibid. Rule 224.

-1The Commission has just recently circularized uranium issuers requesting
them to provide further information concerning their offering and the subsequent
history of the company. The Commission desires this information in order to
review the effectiveness of Revised Regulation A.
Form 1-A promulgated under Revised Regulation A.
Ibid. Item 1.
"Ibid. Item 2.
Ibid. Item 3.

Ibid. Items 4 and 5.
Ibid. Item 6.
Ibid. Item 7.
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of shifting administrative emphasis from the fraud prevention
requirements of the act to the disclosure aspects of the law. In the
everyday administration of Revised Regulation A, numerous problems arise calling for the exercise of interpolative judgment. Decisions thus reached are then disseminated throughout the Commission and used as a basis for reaching further decisions. Thus,
day by day the unwritten law of the regulation is applied as decisions are reached, not by the specific application of a written
rule, but rather by an extension of the philosophy underlying the
regulation.
There have been times when the Commission has been criticized for its Draconian attitude in administering the act. On the
whole though, the Commission has constantly striven to foster a
policy of fair treatment to all, thus seeking to insure that delicate
and happy balance of aid to the entrepeneur without denying commensurate protection to the investor. The general attitude of the
Commission can best be summed up by resorting to the well turned
phrases of Mr. Justice Douglas in the case of Estin v. Estin 29
wherein he stated:
There are few areas of the law in black and white. The
greys are dominant and even among them the shades are
innumerable. For the eternal problem of the law is one of
making accommodations between conflicting interests.
334 U. S. 541 (1948).

The following special committees of the Colorado Bar Association were appointed subsequent to the publication of the Annual
Report and do not appear therein. For your information the membership of these committees are as follows:
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George S. Graham, Grand Junction, Chairman
A. Allen Brown, Delta
Thompson G. Marsh, Denver
Thos. M. Burgess, Colo. Spgs.
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Elias J. Candell, Lakewood
Fred E. Neef, Denver
Frederic B. Emigh, Durango
Bryant O'Donnell, Denver
Clyde R. Hampton, Denver
Paul B. Rodden, Denver
Cecil Haynie. Grand Junction
Marsh Seraphine, Gunnison
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William G. Sumners, Denver
Edward G. Knowles, Denver
Charles Traylor, Gr. Junction
George V. Kempf, Montrose
William G. Waldeck, Montrose
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Fred N. Holland, Denver
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THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A DISCOVERY
EXCAVATION IN COLORADO
By PHILIP C. KLINGSMITH of the Gunnison Bar

The sudden and tremendous increase in the number of mining
claims discovered, staked and filed which has resulted from the requirement of the government for a large and stable source of
domestic fissionable ore has raised to vital practical importance
the question of what is a legal discovery excavation in Colorado.
In the absence of legislative pronouncement clarifying these requirements, many miners and prospectors, large and small, are
confused as to the requirements.
The requirements of a legal discovery excavation to hold a
lode claim upon the public domain in Colorado are laid down by
the Colorado legislature. The United States Statutes require that
no location of a mining claim shall be made until the discovery of
the vein or lode within the limits of the claim located, 30 U.S.C.A.
Sec. 23. But the exploration of mineral deposits on the public
domain is regulated by state law and according to local custom
in the several mining districts, not inconsistent with the laws of
the United States, Sec. 22. Therefore, there being no U. S. statute
laying down the requirement of a discovery excavation, we must
look to the laws of the State of Colorado to determine what these
requirements are.
An owner of an unpatented lode claim can be sure that his
discovery excavation meets the statutory requirements if, within
sixty days from the date of discovery, (1) he sinks a shaft upon
the lode to the depth of at least ten feet from the lowest part of the
rim of said shaft at the surface, or deeper, if necessary, to show a
well defined crevice, (Chapter 92, Art. 22, Sec. 6, CRS 1953), or
(2) if he excavates an open cut, cross cut or tunnel which cuts
the lode at a depth of ten feet below the surface. Sec. 8, supra.
However, for the majority of the amateur weekend prospectors,
upon whom the government is to a large extent relying to discover
the large amounts of fissionable materials necessary to meet the
present requirement for the cold war, and the vast quantities
necessary to meet future peacetime needs, the above provisions are
prohibitively difficult and expensive. In order to sink a shaft described above in the geological formations in which fissionable
ores have most commonly been found in Colorado, heavy and expensive equipment, requiring high cost labor to operate, must be
used to drill to the necessary depth. Consequently, a large percentage of the claims which have been located in Colorado do not
meet the requirements of Sec. 6. Prospectors have instead made
a scoop-out either by hand labor or with a bulldozer uncovering
ore for a horizontal distance of ten feet or more and to a depth
of from six inches to three or more feet. The saving in cost of suclh
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a discovery adit is, of course, enormous. The vital question is,
will such a discovery adit hold the lode?
The writer is of the opinion that the scoop-out discovery adit
is and should be held to be in compliance with the statutory requirements and that the holding of such a discovery adit to be
sufficient to meet the legal requirements is in harmony with the
intent of Congress to encourage people who have primary occupations in the cities and on the farms and ranches to prospect for and
mine fissionable ores in their leisure time.
Chapter 92, Art. 22, Sec. 8, CRS 1953 provides that in addition to a shaft ten feet deep, as described in Sec. 6, "Any open cut,
cross-cut or tunnel which shall cut a lode at the depth of ten feet
below the surface, shall hold such lode, the same as if a discovery
shaft were sunk thereon, or an adit of at least ten feet in along
the lode from the point where the lode may be in any manner
discovered, shall be equivalent to a discovery shaft".
It is clear that any open cut to be sufficient under the statute
must be ten feet deep, but it is equally clear that an adit need not
be. An adit is sufficient if it is ten feet in along the lode. The
question for determination then is, what is an adit? An adit in
Colorado is what the Supreme Court has held it to be in cases
which have come before it and properly raised the question. The
Supreme Court has spoken upon three such occasions. In the case
entitled Gray v. Truby,l the Court adopted Webster's definition of
an adit as being "an entrance or a passage, a term used in mining
to denote the opening by which a mine is entered, or by which water
and ores are carried away; called also the drift". It is helpful to
look at the facts of that case to determine exactly what kind of an
excavation was deemed an adit and given the Court's stamp of approval. Gray, the plaintiff, testified that we "did our work by running in along a vein of mineral about 3 inches deep for 20 or 25
feet, the cut being 8 or 9 feet deep at the lowest and deepest end".
He further testified that "we took this cut for our discovery." The
plaintiff's testimony precluded the Court from considering a shaft
subsequently sunk on the claim as the discovery. Other witnesses
for plaintiff testified the excavation was less than ten feet deep
and that the "cut" ran along the vein of mineral.
In Electro-Magnetic Mining and Development Co. v. Van
Aken, 2 the Court expressly rejected the concept that to be an adit,
the excavation had to be under cover, i.e., run beneath the surface,
or that it had to be of any maximum depth. The Court stated that
the legislature meant by the term "adit", an excavation in and
along the lode, for a distance of ten feet to be measured from a
point where the lode may be in any manner discovered.
The Supreme Court specifically affirmed its former holdings
in Craig v. Thompson,a in which case it said, "The distance re'6 Colo. 278 (1882).
-9 Colo. 204, 11 P. 80 (1886).
'10 Colo. 517, 16 P. 24 (1887).
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quired for an adit to be run, in, upon or along a lode is ten feet,
without regard to depth". The Court rejected the argument advanced by the defendant that in order to make a valid discovery,
plaintiffs must have cut, by their work in such discovery, ten feet
below the surface.
In none of the three cases in which the Court discussed the
sufficiency of an adit to hold the lode, was the question of uncovering a vein of mineral raised, that is to say, in each case, the adit
did follow and uncover a vein of mineral. Just as it is necessary
for a discovery shaft to show a well defined crevice, it is necessary
for an adit to follow in along the lode. An adit which did not follow
the lode would be no more effective in holding the claim than would
be a ten foot shaft which did not disclose a crevice.
A mine is described as a pit or excavation from which ores,
etc., are taken by digging. A scoop-out along the lode which uncovers ore would therefore be classified both as a mine and the
entrance to the mine from which ores are removed, or an adit.
We therefore believe the Colorado Supreme Court, following its
former decisions, would hold that a scoop-out which uncovered
fissionable ores for a horizontal distance of at least ten feet would
constitute an adit and therefore be legally sufficient under the
statute to hold the lode.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-HUSBAND AND WIFE, AGENCY,
FAMILY CAR DOCTRINE.-Moore v. Skiles, 1954-55 C.B.A. Adv.
Sheet No. 1.
The facts of the case are these: the plaintiff and her husband
were riding in a pick-up truck owned jointly by them both; the
husband was driving and the wife was occupying the seat next to
him. During the course of the trip, a collision with a vehicle driven
by the defendant occurred. The wife brought suit to recover damages to herself and the truck predicated on the negligence of the
defendant.
After trial was had, the jury returned a verdict complying
with instruction No. 4, in which it found for the defendant. Instruction No. 4 was, in substance, that if the jury found that the
accident was caused by the negligence of both drivers, then the
plaintiff, (who was neither of the drivers) could not recover. The
plaintiff assigned error to the fact that the trial court allowed the
negligence of the driver-husband to be imputed to the passengerwife. The Supreme Court stated the problem thusly:
When a husband and wife are journeying together in
a vehicle jointly owned by both and engaged in a mission
with a purpose common to both, can the negligence of the
husband in operating the vehicle be imputed to the wife?
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This question was answered in the affirmative. In arriving
at its conclusion, the Court mentioned several theories, any of
which in itself would have been sufficient.
The rules of imputed negligence are, rhetorically speaking,
the rules of vicarious liability working in reverse: where a person
against whom a claim for relief is asserted is not himself personally
negligent, yet he may be held liable because of his relationship
with the one who was the negligent party; so too may one who
asserts a claim based on negligence be subject to the defense of
contributory negligence because of his relationship with one who
actively participated in the incident. It is the definition of that
relationship that was the primary subject of this decision.
a It is almost universally held that the relationship of driver
and passenger between two persons is not in itself sufficient to
impute negligence from one to the other.1
but there is a well-recognized exception to this rule
when the injured person is in a position to exercise authority or control over the driver, or is guilty, or fails to exercise such care
under the particular circumstances to pro2
tect himself.
Moreover, the existence of the marital relationship is not adequate
to impute the negligence of the husband to the wife "unless he is
her agent in the matter at hand, or they are jointly engaged in the
prosecution of a common enterprise." 3
It is the substance of the relationship, therefore, that is the
determinant factor, and not the form. As stated above, the connection as husband and wife, or as driver and passenger, or even
as a combination of the two is not that substance out of which imputed negligence arises. The association between persons substantial enough to carry the imputation is that of agency, express or
implied, and the quality of the association is tested by the right to
control of one over the other.
In this case the Court found, or at least inferred, that the right
to control may have arisen between the plaintiff in any one of
several ways. The first to be considered is that of the family car
doctrine.
This doctrine was first noted in Colorado in the case of Hutchins v. Haffner,4 where the Court said:
...a husband is liable for the injury inflicted by his automobile which he purchased for family use, while it was
I Dale v. Denver Tramway Co., 173 F. 787, 97 CCA 511, 19 Ann. Cas. 1223,
8 LRA (NS) 597; Atchison, T. & S. RR. v. McNulty, 285 F. 97; Colo. Springs Co.
v. Cohun, 66 Colo. 149, 180 P. 307.
2 C. & S. RR. Co. v. Thomas, 33 Colo. 405, 81 P. 801, 70 LRA 681.
* Phillips f Denver Tramway Co., 53 Colo. 458, 128 P. 460, Ann, Cas. 1914B,
29.
, 63 Colo. 365, 167 P. 966.
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being operated by his wife, solely for her own pleasure
under his general permission to use the machine whenever
and wherever she pleased, upon the theory that the wife
was the husband's agent in carrying out one of the purposes for which the car was purchased and owned.
This principle is then an expression of the general law of
agency, though it may be implied, based on the right to control and
acts committed within the scope of authority. But the difficulty
in this instance is apparent not only in that the negligence is to
be imputed between co-owners, but also because it is to be imputed
to the wife, who is not the "head of the family". A study of the
record in this case would disclose that there is no evidence to the
effect that the husband-driver had any general permission in the
use of the car; no evidence that the "husband in this case had general authority to drive the car whenever and wherever he pleased",
as the Court stated. It is the opinion of this writer that the Court
would not have imputed the negligence in this case on the grounds
of "family car" if that were the only possibility, because of the
lack of evidence of the general permission.
Another theory used by the court was the presumption that an
owner-occupant of a car has the right of control over the driver.
The presumption that attends the situation in which the owner
of a car is a non-driving occupant has never before appeared in
the Colorado reports. This Court cited, with apparent approval,
the case of Fox v. Lacvender,5 but did not expressly say that the
rule of the Fox case was controlling. The rule is this:
...where an owner is an occupant of his own car there
arises a rebuttable presumption that has control and
direction of it . . . Where a sole owner is driving it is
presumed, without more, that he is in control and has the
complete right of control; when the sole owner is present
in the car and another is driving, it is presumed without
more being shown, that the sole owner has the right of
control, and that the driver is driving for him, that is,
as his agent. If two or more joint owners are in the car,
they will be presumed to have the joint right of control
and therefore the driver will be presumed to be driving
for himself and as the agent of the other present joint
owners.
This view, though popular in an impressive number of jurisdictions, is by no means universally accepted, but represents
one
6
side of what is a decided split of authority in this country. It is
this writer's belief that the presumption of control should stand
in a situation such as this because it facilitates the ascertainment
56 P. 2d 1049, 89 Utah 115, 109 ALR 105.
'158 A. 166, 305 Pa. 479, 80 ALR 280.
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of truth that would not otherwise be discoverable,
and is based on
7
common experience and usual connection.
Although the Court indicated approval of imputing negligence in this case through the use of the family car doctrine, or
the presumption of control by an occupant-owner, the decision is
more correctly said to be based on the theory of joint enterprise.
The Court said:
Where, as here, joint ownership of the car is shown;
where joint occupancy and possession of the vehicle is
admitted, and where the occupant-owners of the car use
it upon a joint mission, the driver will be presumed to be
driving for himself and as agent for the other present
joint owner.
This statement does not encompass the family relationship or general permission of the family car doctrine. Neither does it adopt
the presumption of control by an owner-occupant, for it adds the
requirement that there be a use upon a joint mission or common
purpose.
The basis for decision is joint venture, which finding was
facilitated by a presumption consisting of joint ownership, joint
occupancy and common purpose to show such joint venture.
It should be remembered that the circumstances found in this
decision do not give rise to any new substantive law. The law
deciding this case is the conventional doctrine of the master's responsibility for his servant. The presumption which was indulged
was only a device to find such a relationship, and this presumptioh
was rebuttable. Subsequent litigants who find themselves in similar situations may defend their vicarious liability or disability by
showing non-agency, the true relationship of driver and guest, or
that of bailor and bailee, or any of the other possible defenses to
such allegation. Not all joint owners who travel together carry
with them this contagious negligence, but they must be prepared
at trial to administer the serum of rebutting evidence.
HERB WEISER
'American Insurance Co. v. Naylor, 101 Colo. 34, 70 P. 2d 349; Roberts v.
People, 9 Colo. 458, 13 P. 630.

ANNOUNCING A.B.A. REGIONAL MEETING
Set aside the dates April 13-16, 1955 on your calendar. Those
are the days you should plan to be in Phoenix, Arizona, at the
Westward Ho Hotel! An excellent program of events is scheduled
and will be in the mail soon. Here's a chance for a short vacation
along with an opportunity to get the latest scoop on various phases
of the law. All this-and deductible too!
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CONVENTION RESERVATIONS
Editor's Note: Most everyone is familiar with the plan used last year for
convention reservations. The members attending the convention, in addition
to the Broadmoor Hotel, were very satisfied with the results. Due to the success of the plan the Convention Committee has decided to adopt it en toto for
this year's convention. Since Terry had described the problems involved, and
the plan itself, so aptly in last February's issue of DICTA we re-submit it for
your guidance at this time. Promptness is tantamount to success.

There was an old woman who lived in a shoe. She had so
many lawyers she didn't know what to do. That, in a word, expresses the problem that has mutiplied the grey hairs in the heads
of Colorado Bar Association Presidents of recent years and has
driven to near distraction the kindly and courteous managers of
the Broadmoor Hotel. A special committee was appointed to solve
the problem of reservations and assignment of rooms at the Broadmoor Hotel at the convention to be held next October.
It is an unfortunate fact that in recent years far more requests
for reservations have been received by the Broadmoor than could
be filled. The annual convention has attained a popularity and importance to the members of the Colorado Bar Association which
is most gratifying but which has led to a highly competitive scramble for rooms at the Broadmoor. A study of the records of the
past two or three conventions indicates, however, that much of
this competition is of the toe-in-the-door category and a great many
of the reservations made at the time of the announcement of the
convention dates have been cancelled at the last minute. It is thus
apparent that many reservations are being made by members
simply on the chance that they may attend the convention but
without any definite plan on their part to do so.
The 57th Annual Convention of the Colorado Bar Association
will be held on October 13-15, 1955, at the Broadmoor Hotel in
Colorado Springs. The following procedures will be strictly observed in the handling of reservations for this convention:
1. All requests for reservations must be sent to the Secretary
of the Colorado Bar Association, 525 Mile High Center in Denver.
2. No block reservations will be recognized but each member
of the Association desiring reservations must send in his own request by United States mail.
3. Each reservation request must be accompanied with a
deposit of $15.00. This deposit will not be credited to the hotel bill
(the Broadmoor has a policy against accepting advances on room
rent) but will cover a registration fee of $6.00 and pay for one
ticket each to the Friday and Saturday Luncheons ($2.50 each),
the Saturday night Banquet ($4.00), the President's Reception,
the Friday night entertainment and the Grand Ball on Saturday
night.
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4. On March 7, 1955, all requests for reservations then in the
Secretary's office will be opened simultaneously. If the total number of requests accompanied by a proper deposit does not exceed
the number of rooms which the Broadmoor can make available,
all will be filled. If such requests exceed the number of rooms
available, the rooms will be allocated to the various local Bar
Associations, pro-rated according to the membership of each Association. Associations having more requests for reservations than
rooms assigned may select by lot or otherwise the registrants to
be approved. Such selection would be made by the local Bar Association involved with the results certified to the Secretary of the
Colorado Bar Association.
5. Letters requesting reservations will be sent by the secretary to the Broadmoor Hotel when approved in the above manner.
The hotel will be responsible for the actual assignment of rooms.
6. Deposits will be returned to those not receiving reservations unless they desire to leave their request on file in the hope of
obtaining a reservation cancelled by another. Those leaving their
deposit with the Bar Association Secretary will receive preference
in the assignment of cancelled reservations.
7. After a reservation is confirmed NO DEPOSIT WILL BE
RETURNED UNLESS A CANCELLATION IS RECEIVED
PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 12, 1955.
If this all sounds like a bookie's nightmare, please remember
that it is the only solution the Committee has been able to devise
which will minimize the possibility of discrimination and which will
give each member of the Colorado Bar Association an equal chance
at a reservation.
Requests for accommodations at the Broadmoor Hotel will now
be received by the Bar Association Secretary.
No advance deposit will be required of members who do not
request reservations at the Broadmoor Hotel. Ample accommodations are available elsewhere in Colorado Springs and the Secretary will assist anyone desiring such facilities.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR CONVENTION
RESERVATIONS,
PETER H. HOLME, JR.,
JACOB S. SCHEY,
RAPHAEL J. MOSES.

